ARP spoofing works because ARP is stateless and unauthenticated, so a host accepts a forged reply that maps the gateway's IP address to the attacker's MAC address. A rogue DHCP server hands out false settings, such as an attacker's gateway or DNS server, or a gateway that does not exist. DHCP snooping, dynamic ARP inspection and static ARP entries are the main defences.
ARP spoofing
MITRE ATT&CK T1557.002 states that ARP is stateless and does not require authentication, so devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address for an IP address in their ARP cache.
An attacker can also send a gratuitous ARP reply that announces ownership of an IP address to every device on the segment.
Example: a workstation's ARP entry for its gateway now holds the attacker's MAC address. Its traffic to the gateway goes to the attacker, who can read it and forward it on. That is an on-path (adversary-in-the-middle) position.
T1557.002 lists signs to watch for: several IP addresses mapped to one MAC address, and repeated gratuitous ARP traffic. Its mitigations are static ARP entries, which may not be practical on large networks, and DHCP snooping with dynamic ARP inspection on switches.
Rogue DHCP servers
ATT&CK T1557.003 describes an attacker acting as a malicious DHCP server, so hosts receive bad settings, for example an adversary-owned DNS server or gateway.
RFC 3118 names the threat to a DHCP client as a rogue server giving incorrect configuration, either to set up a man-in-the-middle attack or for denial of service.
Which one depends on what the lease says. A lease naming the attacker's laptop as gateway puts the attacker on the path. A lease naming a gateway that does not exist cuts clients off from other subnets, which is denial of service.
T1557.003 also notes that DHCP spoofing can be used to exhaust the address pool by sending many DISCOVER messages.
DHCP snooping
RFC 7513 describes switch ports with a DHCP-Trust attribute. Server-to-client DHCP messages are forwarded only from ports where it is set, and by default it is not set.
So the port facing the real DHCP server is trusted, and offers arriving on user ports are dropped. ATT&CK T1557.003 recommends DHCP snooping because it prevents DHCP spoofing and starvation attacks.
Where the exam catches people
Believing a host only accepts ARP replies it asked for: ARP is stateless, so unsolicited replies can update the cache.
Believing a rogue DHCP server is always an on-path attack: a lease with a nonexistent gateway is a denial of service.
Believing DHCP snooping trusts every port by default: ports are untrusted unless configured, and offers from them are dropped.
Believing ARP spoofing changes the victim's DNS answers: it changes the IP-to-MAC mapping; rogue DHCP is what can hand out a bad DNS server.